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CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS ON VOUCHING
I. INTRODUCTION
Section 2-607(5) (a) of the Uniform Commercial Code presents
an interesting question of a state court's jurisdiction over out of state
residents. The statute provides for a procedure called "vouching in"
of third-party defendants who may be wholly, jointly, or jointly and
severally liable to a plaintiff.' It reads:
Section 2-607. Effect of Acceptance; Notice of Breach;
Burden of Establishing Breach After Acceptance; Notice of
Claim or Litigation to Person Answerable Over.
(5) Where the buyer is sued for breach of a warranty or
other obligation for which his seller is answerable over
(a) he may give his seller written notice of the litigation.
If the notice states that the seller may come in and defend and
that if the seller does not do so he will be bound in any action
against him by his buyer by any determination of fact common
to the two litigations, then unless the seller after seasonable
receipt of the notice does come in and defend he is so bound.'
To illustrate the jurisdictional problem which this statute raises,
this Comment will examine three variations on the following hypothe-
tical, triangular relationship: a consumer purchases a product from a
retailer, who originally purchased the product from a manufacturer;
the consumer is injured by or because of the product and brings an
action in a state court against the retailer; the retailer in turn tries to
bring the manufacturer into the suit.
The author wishes to thank Professors John 0. Honnold, Paul J. Mishkin, and
Robert A. Gorman of the University of Pennsylvania Law School for their assistance
and instructive counsel in preparation of this Comment. Professor Gorman's guidance
and patience were especially invaluable. However, despite his indebtedness to these
men, the author bears final responsibility for the contents of this Comment.
I Subsection (5) (b) contains similar procedures for claims involving "infringe-
ment or the like":
(b) if the claim is one for infringement or the like . . . the original
seller may demand in writing that his buyer turn over to him control of the
litigation including settlement or else be barred from any remedy over and if
he also agrees to bear all expense and to satisfy any adverse judgment, then
unless the buyer after reasonable receipt of the demand does turn over control
the buyer is so barred.
2 UNIFoRM Com CAL CoD § 2-607(5) (a).
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A. Hypothetical Situations
1. The Bar-Be-Safe Case
"Don't worry, Dear," the Californian assured his wife. "The man
at the department store told me this new charcoal lighter won't flare up
when you squirt it on the fire. I'll pour the whole can on." The in-
evitable happened, and two months later the Californian filed a com-
plaint in a California state court against Trusty Department Store, a
California corporation, to recover damages caused by the exploded
can of Bar-Be-Safe. The instructions on Bar-Be-Safe cans proclaimed
that the new product could be applied to open flames without igniting
the stream from the can. On the strength of this statement and similar
assurances from the manufacturer's aggressive California sales staff,
Trusty Department Store had purchased one hundred cases of Bar-Be-
Safe from the manufacturer, Home Fuels Corporation.
Home Fuels is organized under the laws of Missouri where it main-
tains its manufacturing plant and principal place of business. It does
a substantial interstate business in fuels for cigarette lighters, camping
stoves, and insect repellant torches, selling its products to retailers
through its offices in California and other states.
2. The Safety Valve Case
Mr. and Mrs. Gray, residents of Illinois, were sitting at dinner
one evening when the chandelier fell on Mrs. Gray. A water heater
purchased from American Radiator Corporation had exploded, shaking
the house and breaking loose the chandelier. Investigation revealed
that the safety valve on the heater did not work properly. American
Radiator, an Ohio corporation which manufactures water heaters and
radiators and sells them throughout the Midwest, purchases safety
valves for its water heaters from the larger Titan Valve Company.
Titan, also an Ohio corporation, carries on no direct business activities
in Illinois although a substantial number of its products enter Illinois
through companies such as American. The Grays brought an action for
personal injury and property damage in an Illinois court against
American Radiator Corporation.
3. The Rodent Stopper Case
One night at the Albany, New York, branch of Nation-wide Steak
Houses, Incorporated, an elderly lady looking for tomatoes found a
large rat at the bottom of the big help-yourself salad bowl. About an
hour later, three rats ran across the bar while six others attacked the
pastry tray. That evening was the last in Albany for Nation-wide.
A few days before, the Albany manager had noticed a rat in one of
the garbage pails and immediately reported the incident to the central
office of Nation-wide, located in Wilmington, Delaware. He was told
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that the Hartford, Connecticut, restaurant had experienced a similar
problem with mice in its cheese cake and had solved it by using a chemi-
cal compound called Say-a-Buck Rodent Stopper. The office advised
him that the Hartford restaurant had five bags of the product which
would be sent to Albany the following morning. Unfortunately, this
batch of Rodent Stopper worked well enough with mice but actually
seemed to attract rats.
Say-a-Buck, Incorporated, which sold the Rodent Stopper to
Nation-wide, is organized under the laws of Delaware, where its execu-
tive offices are located, and has stores in many states, including ten in
New York. It sells most of its products under its own brand name,
contracting out the manufacturing whenever possible to companies
located in the vicinity of each store. Products are standardized by using
common specifications in each contract. Hamlan Chemical Company,
a relatively small concern near Hartford, had contracted to manufacture
a fixed amount of the compound each year for the Hartford Say-a-Buck
store, and had supplied the rodent control compound sold in the Hart-
ford store. Nation-wide Steak Houses sued Say-a-Buck in a New York
state court.
B. Vouching in the Manufacturer
In each of the three hypothetical cases, the named defendant-
Trusty Department Store, American Radiator Corporation, or Say-a-
Buck-would like to make the manufacturer a party to the litigation
to avoid the possibility that the first forum would hold the retailer
liable to the consumer for the manufacturer's breach of warranty while
a second forum would find no breach by the manufacturer, leaving the
retailer shouldering the entire liability. One method to achieve this
goal is the vouching provision of the UCC.' Thus in each case a
letter should be mailed to the manufacturer in accordance with this
modern codification of the ancient practice called "vouching." 4
The vouching letters would contain no mention of grounds for
jurisdiction over the manufacturer other than the provision in the Uni-
form Commercial Code. This is a distinct advantage, for if the named
defendants tried to implead the manufacturers, they would have to
allege the basis of the forum's jurisdiction over these out of state
corporations. In the latter two hypotheticals, there is considerable
danger that such an allegation could not be sustained, either because
assumption of jurisdiction over the manufacturer in impleader might
be without statutory basis, or, if authorized by statute, might violate the
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. Section 2-607(5) (a)
appears to provide a way to involve and bind the manufacturer without
worrying about due process limitations on jurisdiction.
3Id.
4 See UNIFORM Comx.RcIAL CODE § 2-607, Comment 7.
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The Uniform Commercial Code nowhere specifically determines the
scope of a court's power to adjudicate questions of fact and to bind a
vouched in, out of state party to the court's findings. Although some
commentators have assumed that a forum must have jurisdiction before
a party can validly be bound by its determination through a vouching
letter,5 others state that jurisdictional considerations are irrelevant to
the vouching letter.'
It is not easy to decipher which of these positions the draftsmen
of the code adopted. The legislative history of the provision is suffi-
ciently cryptic to preclude confident analysis of the role vouching was
to play in the statutory scheme. Nevertheless, one can reasonably
deduce the intention of the draftsmen. While official comments to the
present section afford very little assistance,7 earlier comments are more
helpful. In the May, 1949, draft (which interestingly contained
provisions for both impleader and vouching),' the comment states that
the section's purpose was to help in "the problem of simplifying and
speeding up the process of settling claims made against a buyer who is
in an intermediate position in the chain of distribution." ' The comment
on the article 3 counterpart to section 2-607(5) (a) in the 1952 version
is more explicit:
The section is not intended to displace existing procedures
for interpleader or joinder of parties but to supplement such
procedures in situations in which jurisdictional or procedural
difficulties prevent their complete effectiveness.
Even with the section in force there will be many cases
in which persons who may be liable on the instrument cannot
be made parties defendant because their presence as parties
would oust the jurisdiction of the court or because they are
not subject to service of process in the jurisdiction where the
action is brought. The section means that such persons may
be notified and have a right to intervene, but that, after season-
able written notice, even if they do not intervene they will be
concluded as to any issue of fact determined in the action.",
6 See Comment, Sales Law-The "Vouching In" Provision of the Uniform Com-
mnercial Code, 36 CoNN. BJ. 288, 289-91 (1962).
0GSee Degnan & Barton, Vouching to Quality Warranty: Case Law and Corn-
mnercial Code, 51 CALiF. L. REV. 471, 478-79 (1963) [hereinafter cited as Degnan
& Barton].
7 The only statement made is that "subsection (5) (a) codifies for all warranties
the practice of voucher to defend." UNIFORM COMMERCIAL COnE § 2-607, Comment 7.
The official comment to § 3-803 (the vouching provision for commercial paper) is
similarly uninstructive.
8 The present wording of § 2-607(5) (a) was carried forward from the 1949 draft
without substantial change. Compare UNIFORM COmmERCLAL CODE §§2-718, 3-803
(1949 draft) with UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §§ 2-607(5) (a), 3-803.
9 UNIFORM CoMMERCIAL CODE § 2-718, Comment 1 (1949 draft).
10 UNIroRM COMMERCIAL CODE § 3-803, Comment (1952 version); see UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE § 3-803, Comment (1949 draft) (provision meant to apply "where
jurisdictional difficulties prevent . . . joinder"); cf. STATE OF NEW JER EY Com-
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Later comments omit mention of the jurisdictional issue. Although it
is difficult to assign any particular import to this silence, it is quite likely
that the draftsmen of the vouching provision accepted the position that
in order for the vouching letter to have a binding effect, the forum
need not have jurisdiction over the vouched in party.
This conclusion suggests three successive inquiries. First, what
are the constitutional limitations on state courts assuming jurisdiction
in multistate situations? Second, do these limitations apply to vouching?
Finally, what inherent characteristics of vouching, if any, would preclude
application of these restrictions?
II. THE CONSTITUTIONAL SCOPE OF JURISDICTION
A. A Theory of Due Process
In determining the reach of a state's adjudicatory power," two
factors are relevant. The first factor is whether the state has a statute
or other rule of law giving its courts jurisdiction over the party in
question. The second is whether the exercise of jurisdiction authorized
by the statute is within the bounds prescribed by the fourteenth
amendment.'2
The inquiry into the first factor usually involves a court's constru-
ing the language of a long-arm statute to see whether the defendant
comes within its scope.13 In vouching cases the Code provision is the
long-arm statute. Although it does not speak in terms of an interstate
MISSION TO STUDY AND REPORT UPON THE UNIFORM COMMERCmL CODE FOR NEW
JERSEY, 2D REPORT §2-607, Study Comment 5 (1960).
"1 The term "jurisdiction" is often used loosely to mean a number of quite distinct
concepts ranging from allocation of subject matter within a single judicial system
(competence) to the division of geographical units within the system (venue). The
term "jurisdiction" as used in this Comment refers to the power--concomitant with
the right of a sovereign legal system-to adjudicate a case. Where the right and
power exist, at least in the context of American states, other jurisdictions are nor-
mally bound by determinations in the first forum. See A. voN MEHREN & D. TRAuT-
MAN, TiiE LAW OF MULTISTATE PROBLEMS 589-90 (1965) in which the authors
describe jurisdiction as "adjudicatory jurisdiction in the international sense." Id.
22 See Longines-Wittnauer Watch Co. v. Barnes & Reinecke, Inc., 15 N.Y2d 443,
209 N.E2d 68, 261 N.Y.S2d 8 (1965), in which Judge Fuld distinguished between
whether a legislature could constitutionally authorize jurisdiction in a given case and
whether it in fact did so. Id. at 459-60, 209 N.E2d at 77, 261 N.Y.S2d at 20-21.
lB Since the Supreme Court's decision in Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927),
upholding the constitutionality of a Massachusetts statute which gave Massachusetts
courts personal jurisdiction over nonresident motorists in actions arising out of their
operation of a motor vehicle within the state, every state has enacted some sort of
long-arm statute which bases jurisdiction on the relationship between the defendant's
activities in the forum state and the cause of action. See R. CBAmToN & D. CURRIE,
CONFLICT OF LAWS 477-78 (1968). Early statutes were cautious and limited. It was
not until the Court offered more general guidelines on the constitutional standards
in International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945), that the present
panoply of legislation began to appear. See Developments in the Law-State-Court
Jurisdiction, 73 HARv. L. REv. 909, 1000 (1960).
Article I of the UNIFORM INTERSTATE AND INTERNATIONAL PROCEDURE ACT, in
9B UNIFORM LAWS ANNOTATED 305 (1966), represents an amalgamation of the more
progressive state statutes and is instructive in assessing present thinking in the area.
The relevant section of article I is § 1.03 [Personal Jurisdiction Based upon Conduct],
which provides:
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situation (as do typical long-arm statutes), it does appear to give the
forum the power to make determinations binding on persons regardless
of whether they are within the jurisdiction.14 Indeed, section 2-607-
(5) (a) is a unique long-arm statute. It does not authorize official
service of process on the vouched in person, it does not authorize suits
or claims to be brought against him, and it does not authorize naming
him as a defendant. He is informed by private letter from the named
defendant. However, he may refuse to defend without sanction of a
default judgment; he is only bound by the fact determinations. Fur-
thermore, not only does the forum state claim the power to adjudicate
with respect to, and bind, a nonresident, but also, as part of a nearly
universally enacted code,'5 the law of the vouched in party's residence
(and that of the forum of any subsequent action) separately confers the
power on the forum.
Since the first question-whether the long-arm statute grants juris-
diction-is answered affirmatively by the vouching provision, the second
question poses the key issue: whether the exercise of that jurisdiction
conferred by the Code is within the bounds of due process.
It is clear that a state's jurisdiction is not constitutionally limited
by its physical boundaries. The Supreme Court has granted judicial
control beyond a state's physical power over a party.'0 One can deter-
mine the extent of this expanded jurisdiction by examining judicial
development beginning with Mr. Justice Stone's opinion for the Court
in International Shoe Co. v. Washington: "
(a) A court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a person, who acts
directly or by an agent, as to a [cause of action] [claim for relief] arising
from the person's
(1) transacting any business in this state;
(2) contracting to supply services or things in this state;
(3) causing tortious injury by an act or omission in this state;
(4) causing tortious injury in this state by an act or omission outside this
state if he regularly does or solicits business, or engages in any other
persistent course of conduct, or derives substantial revenue from
goods used or consumed or services rendered, in this state; [or]
(5) having an interest in, using, or possessing real property in this
state [; or
(6) contracting to insure any person, property, or risk located within
this state at the time of contracting].
(b) When jurisdiction over a person is based solely upon this section,
only a [cause of action] [claim for relief] arising from acts enumerated in
this section may be asserted against him.
The term "person" is defined in § 1.01 to include corporations and other commercial
entities, and § 1.04 allows service to be made outside the state whenever jurisdiction
is authorized under article I.
14 But see Comment, Sales Law--The "Vouching In" Provision of the uniform
Commercial Code, 36 CONN. B.J. 288 (1962), which argues that a separate long-arm
statute must authorize the forum's jurisdictions before a party can be vouched in, id.
289-91, but does not explain why the vouching provision itself is insufficient
authorization.
15 See Preface to 4 UCC REP. Smv. at iv (1968).
16See McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
17 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
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[D]ue process requires only that in order to subject a de-
fendant to a judgment in personam, if he be not present within
the territory of the forum, he have certain minimum contacts
with it such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend
"traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice." 18
This approach to due process suggests a functional rather than a
mechanical treatment of jurisdiction problems. In cases involving cor-
porations, the opinion notes, "presence" and "consent" are fictional
concepts which fit into a rubric of legal conclusions but are unhelpful
in determining the appropriate relationships between factual situations
and the principles underlying due process. The real question is whether
the defendant's contacts with the forum state
make it reasonable, in the context of our federal system of
government, to require the corporation to defend the particular
suit which is brought there. An "estimate of the inconven-
iences" which would result to the corporation from a trial
away from its "home" or principal place of business is relevant
in this connection.
Whether due process is satisfied must depend . . . upon the
quality and nature of the activity in relation to the fair and
orderly administration of the laws which it was the purpose
of the due process clause to insure. That clause does not con-
template that a state may make binding a judgment in
personam against an individual or corporate defendant with
which the state has no contacts, ties, or relations.19
In International Shoe the Court found that the defendant had the
requisite contacts with the forum. The State of Washington brought
the suit in its own courts, claiming that International Shoe owed con-
tributions to the state's unemployment compensation fund. International
Shoe, a Delaware corporation, had its manufacturing plant and distri-
bution center in St. Louis, its principal place of business. It had no
office in Washington but, during the four years in question, employed
about twelve salesmen there, who were under the supervision of the
St. Louis office and who received commissions on sales. No stock was
maintained for sale in Washington, nor were any contracts "made"
there. The salesmen showed samples to prospective purchasers, occa-
sionally renting rooms for this purpose, and solicited orders at a fixed
price. The Court found that the defendant's continuous and systematic
activities within the forum state gave rise to its putative liability and
were sufficient to confer jurisdiction on Washington.
20
18 Id. at 316 (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940).
11 Id. at 317-19.
20 Id.
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After International Shoe the Supreme Court considered two other
major cases involving the adjudicatory power of states over non-
residents. In one, jurisdiction was sustained, but in the other it was
denied. The first was McGee v. International Life Insurance Co.'
An action was brought in a California state court by the beneficiary of
a life insurance policy against a Texas-based insurance company for the
proceeds of the policy. The company had refused to pay, claiming that
the insured committed suicide. The policy was originally written by an
Arizona insurance company, whose insurance obligations the defendant
assumed. The defendant mailed a reinsurance certificate to the insured
in California, and the insured accepted the defendant's offer to continue
insuring him on the terms of the original policy. He mailed the pre-
miums from his home in California. Neither the Arizona company nor
the defendant appeared to have any offices or agents in California, and
there was no evidence that the defendant had done any solicitation or
business in California apart from that connected with the policy in-
volved in the case. The action was brought under a California statute
which grants its courts jurisdiction over foreign insurance companies
in cases involving the insurance of California residents, whether or not
process can be served within the state.
The Court held that California's assumption of jurisdiction did not
violate due process. The insurance contract created "substantial connec-
tions" with California, and the state had a legitimate, expressed concern
in protecting its residents from refusals of insurance companies to pay
the proceeds of policies.' Forcing plaintiffs to bring actions in foreign
forums would make recovery more burdensome and perhaps prohibi-
tively expensive or inconvenient, especially in those instances in which
smaller claims were involved.23 Furthermore, the Court noted, the
crucial witnesses were likely to be in the insured's state, as they were in
this case.24 Whatever inconvenience resulted to the insurance company
simply did not amount to a denial of due process in light of the fact that
it had undertaken to insure a California resident. 5
In the second case, Hanson v. Denckla, 0 the Court held the forum's
assumption of jurisdiction unconstitutional. The issue was whether
Florida could determine the disposition of property held in trust in
Delaware and bind Delaware trustees who refused to heed the Florida
court's call to "come on down." The settlor created the trust with the
Delaware trustees while she was a resident of Pennsylvania. She later
moved to Florida where she died and in whose courts her will was
probated. The trustees carried on their administrative activities in
Delaware, and neither had a Florida office, transacted any business in
21355 U.S. 220 (1957).
2 Id. at 223.
23 Id.
24 Id.
25Id. at 224.
26357 U.S. 235 (1958).
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Florida, nor made solicitations of Florida residents. The case involved
the effectiveness of the settlor's exercise of her power of appointment
over the trust and subsequent disposition of part of the trust corpus
under her will. In discussing personal jurisdiction over the Delaware
trustees, the Court said that although the bases of adjudicatory power
over nonresidents had become more flexible in response to advances in
technology, transportation, and communication, constitutional concern
had not been abandoned:
[I] t is a mistake to assume that this trend heralds the eventual
demise of all restrictions on the personal jurisdiction of state
courts.
The unilateral activity of those who claim some relationship
with a nonresident defendant cannot satisfy the requirement of
contact with the forum State. The application of that rule will
vary with the quality and nature of the defendant's activity,
but it is essential in each case that there be some act by which
the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of con-
ducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the
benefits and protections of its laws."
Because the Delaware trustees were held to be indispensable parties
under Florida law, the Florida adjudication was not binding on anyone.
The Court distinguished McGee by the extent to which the de-
fendants' activities in each case indicated a presence within each forum
state: in McGee the defendant actively solicited the plaintiff's business;
in Hanson the defendant passively acquiesced in the settlor's change of
residence.2  Resting constitutional conclusions on such a factual dis-
tinction at first seems questionable. However, it may make sense if the
distinction reflects substantial patterns of business activities. A large
insurance company typically insures the residents of a number of states.
It is in a position to determine the geographical scope of its business
activities by deciding in which areas it will actively solicit business or
maintain agents. In McGee, the defendant insurance company decided
to assume another insurance company's insurance obligations, including
the decedent's insurance policy. Mailing a reinsurance certificate to
California with an offer to insure was an affirmative act from which an
intention to cover a California risk under California law can be inferred.
It would be naive to suggest that the board of directors carefully delib-
erated over the jurisdictional implications of each out of state risk its
company undertook to insure or even that any thought at all was given
to the issuance of the plaintiff's reinsurance certificate. But it would
not be unrealistic to say that the company actively undertook to deal
27d. at 251-53 (footnotes omitted).
2Id. at 251-52.
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with individuals in another state, thereby associating itself with them
in a way which evoked the legitimate protective interests of their state.
In Hanson, the lack of solicitation in Florida reflected the ordinarily
local scope of a trust company's activities. Occasionally, a trust com-
pany may solicit or agree to accept the business of a settlor in a foreign
jurisdiction, and when it does, a different result may be appropriate.
However, assuming that the Delaware trust company had no knowledge
of the settlor's intention to move to Florida, its role was not active
affiliation with Florida but only acquiescence in the settlor's move. It
never sent agents to Florida to augment or to sustain the contact with
the settlor, but merely continued to administer the trust. The only way
it could have disassociated itself more completely, would have been to
remove itself as trustee when it learned of her intention to reside in
Florida.'
The difference in degree of involvement by the foreign parties in
the forum state in McGee and Hanson justifies their differing results.
The distinction is based on the premise that the reasonableness of re-
quiring a defendant to defend in a particular forum depends in part on
the nature of its business activities and its role in producing the injuries
that evoked the forum's concerns. In analyzing the defendant's role, the
identity of the plaintiff may be important because it can help describe, in
functional terms relevant to due process, the defendant's relationship to
the forum. The analysis of the McGee and Hanson opinions reveals
the importance of the defendant's role in affiliating itself with the plain-
tiff and the forum. Inquiry into the plaintiff's role is a supplementary
approach to the same concerns. Where the plaintiff is a locally-oriented
business entity affected by the interstate activities of a foreign-based
defendant, it does not seem unfair to require the defendant to come to
the plaintiff's jurisdiction to answer claims arising out of his activities.
Conversely, if the plaintiff is a large corporation whose activities
brought it into contact with a relatively stationary individual or locally-
oriented defendant within the forum state, it seems less appropriate to
require the defendant to appear in the plaintiff's forum. Therefore, em-
phasis is not focused on the details of whether the plaintiff or the de-
fendant initiated the first contact, but on a more inclusive determination
concerning the relationship of the parties: that is, how the size, scope,
and nature of the activities of one party affected the normal, localized
activities of the other. When a nonresident defendant is in the position
to plan and initiate this relationship with the forum, allowing that forum
to assert jurisdiction is less likely to offend the traditional notions of
fairness enunciated in International Shoe. Thus, the nature of the
plaintiff helps to describe the defendant's relationship to the forum in
terms of relative fairness to each party.
International Shoe, McGee, and Hanson suggest two considera-
tions in addition to the defendant's involvement with the forum: the
29 A similar but more general analysis is offered in R. CRAT-oN & D. Cul=,
CoNrmcT OF LAWs 484-86 (1968).
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relative litigational conveniences, and the substantive interests of the
forum state. While each of these considerations may assist a state in
determining when to exercise or refrain from exercising its power to
adjudicate, 0 at the constitutional level the primary inquiry is whether
the exercise of the power to adjudicate is consistent with due process.
In this context, litigational convenience and the interest of the forum
state are subsidiary factors which may help to assess fairness in cases
where the relationship between the defendant and the forum state is not
dispositive.
The first consideration, litigational convenience, includes the avail-
ability of evidence, 1 witnesses, and other parties. 2  Measuring this
factor requires balancing the prospective inconvenience to the plaintiff
if the court refuses jurisdiction against the inconvenience to the defend-
ant if jurisdiction is assumed. This factor really is a complementary
method of examining the defendant's affiliation with the forum state.
If witnesses and evidence involving the sale or manufacture of the de-
fendant's goods or services are conveniently located in the forum state,
then this convenience is indicative of the defendant's activities in that
state, and it may not be unfair to involve him in litigation there.
The second consideration which may help to distinguish McGee
from Hanson is the substantive interest of the forum state in protecting
its residents. This interest is primarily in insuring that resident plain-
tiffs are not prevented from collecting legitimate claims by the incon-
venience of suing in the defendant's jurisdiction 3 or by the use of
different law in another forum. Even if another forum would apply the
same law as the plaintiff's state, the expense and inconvenience to an
individual plaintiff who must travel to the other forum with the neces-
sary witnesses may effectively frustrate the legitimate, protective policies
of the plaintiff's state. For example, in McGee the Court noted that the
California statute authorizing service of process on the defendant re-
flected that state's interest in assuring that its residents receive the
30 Courts consider these factors when applying doctrines such as forum non
conveniens. See id. 443.
31 See McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223 (1957); text
accompanying notes 103-05 infra. In McGee the Court noted that "[o]ften the crucial
witnesses-as here on the company's defense of suicide-will be found in the insured's
locality." 355 U.S. at 223.
32 In Hanson about 12 of the named defendants including the trustees, another
trust company to whom the funds in question had been paid, some of the successors
in interest to the plaintiffs, and most of the settlor's appointees were nonresidents.
357 U.S. at 241.
88 See McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
It cannot be denied that California has a manifest interest in providing
effective means of redress for its residents when their insurers refuse to pay
claims. These residents would be at a severe disadvantage if they were forced
to follow the insurance company to a distant State in order to hold it legally
accountable. When claims were small or moderate individual claimants
frequently could not afford the cost of bringing an action in a foreign forum-
thus in effect making the company judgment proof.
Id. at 223; Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352, 356 (1927).
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insurance proceeds to which they are entitled.3 4 Here too, however, it
is important to remember that the primary question on the constitutional
level must be asked in terms of fairness to the defendant, not how state
policies can best be supported.3 5
The Supreme Court has satisfied its concern for "traditional no-
tions of fair play and substantial justice" "' by looking primarily to the
defendant's activities in the state attempting to assume jurisdiction.
Of secondary concern are the nature and activities of the plaintiff, liti-
gational convenience, and the forum's substantive interests. The
Court's emphasis is not on whether the forum makes a correct choice of
law but rather on whether it is fair to the defendant to permit the forum
to make any choice.
B. Constitutional Standards as Applied to Manufacturer-
Middleman-Consumer Situations
In exploring constitutional limitations on the assumption of juris-
diction over the manufacturer by vouching, the relevant cause of action
is that of the retailer against the manufacturer. Jurisdiction here will
be dependent on the degree to which the manufacturer has affiliated
himself with the forum through the retailer. The issue is the vouching
party's ability to bring the vouched in party within the forum's juris-
diction. Discussion will center on the three hypothetical situations
outlined previously.
1. The Bar-Be-Safe Case
This is the easiest case for jurisdiction over the manufacturer.
Home Fuels is a large corporation which continuously maintained an
active California sales office. Through its California agents, Home
Fuels sought the business of smaller California retailers. California
has an interest in protecting not only these retailers but also the local
creditors who finance them. Thus Home Fuels could easily have antici-
pated that any damage resulting from its extensive marketing in Cali-
fornia would evoke that state's concerns. Having intentionally affiliated
34 355 U.S. at 223; see Henry L. Doherty & Co. v. Goodman, 294 U.S. 623, 627-28
(1935), in which the Court, in upholding jurisdiction over a nonresident, recognized
the state's interest in the regulation of securities.
35 Another aspect of the forum's substantive concerns is the relationship between
choice of law and jurisdiction. It suffices to say here that if different law would be
applied so that the possible forums would produce different results, the rules con-
trolling assumption of jurisdiction would become all the more important, and resolu-
tion of the conflict of policies all the more difficult. However, for the state legitimately
concerned about protecting its residents, assumption of jurisdiction is the only way
to effect its policy. See R. CRAMTON & D. CURRI, CoNFIrcT OF LAWS 467-68 (1968) ;
A. VoN MEHREN & D. TRAUTMAN, THE LAW OF MULTISTATE PROBLEMS 599-601
(1965); Ehrenzweig, The Transient Ride of Personal Jurisdiction: The "Power"
Myth and Forum Conveniens, 65 YALE L.J. 289, 292 (1956) ; von Mehren & Trautman,
Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A Suggested Analysis, 79 HAsv. L. REv. 1121, 1128-33
(1966).
36 International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (quoting
Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)).
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itself this closely with the forum state, Home Fuels cannot complain
that California's assumption of jurisdiction violates "traditional notions
of fair play and substantial justice."
2. The Safety Valve Case
The second hypothetical is substantially the same as the factual
circumstances presented to the Illinois Supreme Court in Gray v.
American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp.17 The only significant
difference is that in Gray the plaintiff brought actions against both the
water heater company and valve manufacturer. The Illinois court held
that assumption of jurisdiction over the out of state manufacturer was
consistent with due process. After making the "reasonable inference"
that the company's commercial transactions would "result in substantial
use and consumption in [Illinois]," 38 the court stated:
Where the alleged liability arises, as in this case, from the
manufacture of products presumably sold in contemplation of
use here, it should not matter that the purchase was made from
an independent middleman or that someone other than the
defendant shipped the product into this State.
With the increasing specialization of commercial activity
and the growing interdependence of business enterprises it is
seldom that a manufacturer deals directly with consumers in
other States. The fact that the benefit he derives from its laws
is an indirect one, however, does not make it any the less
essential to the conduct of his business; and it is not unreason-
able, where a cause of action arises from alleged defects in his
product, to say that the use of such products in the ordinary
course of commerce is sufficient contact with this State to
justify a requirement that he defend here. 9
The court also emphasized that Illinois was the jurisdiction in which
the parties could most conveniently settle their dispute. Witnesses on
the issues of injury and damages were likely to be found within its
borders. Furthermore, the plaintiff was an Illinois resident injured in
Illinois, and Illinois law governed the substantive issues.'
Many of the same considerations would apply if the water heater
company brought the action against the valve company, based on Titan's
3-722 Ill. 2d 432, 176 N.E2d 761 (1961).
38 Id. at 442, 176 N.E2d at 766. Contra Chunky Corp. v. Blumenthal Bros.
Chocolate Co., 299 F. Supp. 110 (S.D.N.Y. 1969); O'Brien v. Comstock Foods, Inc.,
123 Vt. 461, 194 A2d 568 (1963), in which the court stated, "[U]nlike the Supreme
Court of Illinois in Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp. [citation
omitted], we cannot infer that the defendant's products have substantial use and con-
sumption in Vermont." Id. at 465, 194 A.2d at 571. The case was remanded with
leave to plaintiff to amend the complaint to allege that defendant's products have
substantial use and consumption in Vermont.
39 22 Ill. 2d at 442, 176 N.E2d at 766.
40 Id. at 443, 176 N.E2d at 766.
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liability over for the damage to the Grays. Titan knew both that its
product would reach Illinois through American Radiator in the ordinary
course of commerce and that, if a defect in its product caused injury
there, American could be required to answer in an Illinois state court.
Furthermore, witnesses and evidence on the damages, the contributory
negligence of the Grays, and the defect in the valve are likely to be lo-
cated in Illinois. Although American, under the hypothetical facts, is a
large manufacturer and distributor of water heaters and will probably
be able to sustain the liability even if it could not recover from Titan,
Illinois has an interest in backing up this ability with the resources of
another large company like Titan.
While these factors justify the court's assumption of jurisdiction,
the justification is much weaker than in the first hypothetical. Since
American is also an out of state corporation, Illinois has no real interest
in protecting it, outside of a tangential concern that companies which
sell to Illinois residents stay in business. Nor is it clear that Illinois is
the most convenient forum. American's action against Titan will in-
volve issues relating to the responsibility of each party for the failure of
the valve to operate properly. Evidence on these issues-such as the
way American incorporated the valve into the heater, whether the valve
met the specifications called for in the contract between Titan and
American, and the manner in which the valve was shipped between the
plants of the two companies-is likely to be located outside Illinois.
The result in this hypothetical turns on the kinds of issues which
the claim involves and the evidence necessary to prove them. To the
extent Titan's business activities caused American to defend against a
suit, grounded on activities in Illinois, Titan affiliated itself with that
state through its relationship to American. Assertion of jurisdiction
on the basis of that affiliation would not be unfair to Titan or deny
it due process.
The approach in Gray admittedly extends International Shoe to its
farthest reaches. Yet this type of approach is presently the rule rather
than the exception. 41  Older cases ' which denied jurisdiction despite
41 In Longines-Wittnauer Watch Co. v. Barnes & Reinecke, Inc., 15 N.Y2d
443, 209 N.E.2d 68, 261 N.Y.S2d 8 (1965), and in a companion case, Singer v.
Walker, 15 N.Y2d 443, 464, 209 N.E2d 68, 80, 261 N.Y.S2d 8, 24 (1965), the Court
of Appeals of New York considered the effective reach of the state's long-arm statute
which authorized assumption of jurisdiction over any person on a cause of action
arising from his committing a tortious act or transacting business in New York.
See N.Y. Cirv. PRAc. LAW §§ 302(a) 1, 2 (McKinney 1963). In Longines-Wittnauer,
the defendant based in Chicago had specially designed and manufactured machines for
plaintiff's plant, mailed contract proposals to plaintiff, sent company officers to plaintiff
to discuss terms of contracts, and sent officers and other employees from its Chicago
plant to New York to test and supervise the installation of plaintiff's machines. The
court found from this combination of factors that the defendant had done business
in New York even though the contract of sale was not executed in New York, and
that New York could thus assume jurisdiction.
Singer, like Gray, involved a 3 party situation. The plaintiff, whose aunt had
purchased a geologist's hammer for him in New York, was injured when the hammer
broke during a trip to Connecticut. The plaintiff brought an action in New York
against the Illinois manufacturer and the store which had sold the hammer. Deter-
mining that the section of the long-arm statute which authorized service of process
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the defendant's knowledge that its product would reach the plaintiff's
state have been subject to criticism from both commentators and
courts. Where a manufacturer knows that substantial amounts of his
goods will enter a certain state, only the most conceptual view of the
boundaries of a state's adjudicatory power would deny the existence of
sufficiently purposeful affiliation.
3. The Rodent Stopper Case
In the third hypothetical situation, the Hamlan Chemical Company
was affiliated with New York state in two ways. Five bags of its
product caused damage in New York, and the retailer selling the product
had a number of stores there. However, the relationship between the
manufacturer and the forum state in this case differs significantly from
the relationship in Gray. Hamlan was not attempting to distribute its
product in New York; it sold its Rodent Stopper entirely through
the Hartford, Connecticut, Say-a-Buck store, presumably to residents
of that community. Because the product is a commodity customarily
used in the purchaser's home or business establishment and readily avail-
able in any community, Hamlan would not have expected that it would
be carried outside the Hartford and Bridgeport areas. The unilateral
and unexpected activity of Nation-wide Steak Houses, not the market-
ing procedure of Hamlan, caused the five bags of Rodent Stopper to
reach New York. Hamlan's relationship to New York is even more
remote than the Delaware trustees' relationship to Florida in Hanson.44
The manufacturer has not engaged in the sort of activities whereby the
middleman would predictably incur liability in New York. The exist-
ence of ten Say-a-Buck stores in New York is irrelevant; Hamlan had
on a defendant who had committed a tortious act within New York did not apply,
the court turned to the "transacting business" clause. The court based jurisdiction on
the grounds that the manufacturer had solicited business in the state through local
representatives and advertisements, and had shipped substantial quantities of its
products into the state. Chief Judge Desmond concurred in the result. He took the
position that the defendant had committed a tortious act in New York and that when
he purposefully sent his product into New York, he gave that state constitutional
authority to assert jurisdiction.
42 See, e.g., Erlanger Mills, Inc. v. Cohoes Fibre Mills, Inc., 239 F2d 502 (4th
Cir. 1956), (a pre-McGee case involving a single shipment of allegedly defective yarn
sent F.O.B. defendant's domicile) ; Conn v. Whitmore, 9 Utah 2d 250, 254, 342 P.2d
871, 874 (1959) (the court stated "there must be some substantial activity which cor-
relates with a purpose to engage in a course of business or some continuity of activity.
[A] single act or transaction does not suffice. . . ."); Grobark v. Addo Machine
Co., 16 Ill. 2d 426, 158 N.E2d 73 (1959).
43 See, e.g., Williams v. Connolly, 227 F. Supp. 539 (D. Minn. 1964) (the court
criticizes Erlanger for an "artificial emphasis on the significance of the State boun-
daries"; id. at 547); Wisconsin Metal & Chemical Corp. v. DeZurik Corp., 222
F. Supp. 119 (E.D. Wis. 1963) (both the Erlanger and Grobark courts were charac-
terized as "unwilling to depart from the conventional tests of doing business"; id. at
123) ; Kurland, The Supreme Court, the Due Process Clause and the ln Personam
Jurisdiction of State Courts: From Pennoyer to Denckla: A Review, 25 U. CHL. L.
REv. 569, 585 (1958).
44 Text accompanying notes 26-29 supra.
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no connection with those stores.4 5  Therefore, in this hypothetical, if
the New York courts exercised jurisdiction, they would deny Hamlan
due process.
46
Thus, while vouching is not necessarily inconsistent with due
process, there are factual situations in which assumption of jurisdiction
would violate the constitutional restrictions. The issue would, as in
other jurisdictional cases, turn on the facts of each case which would
determine whether the manufacturer so affiliated himself with the forum
state that exercise of jurisdiction would not offend due process standards
of fairness and justice. Other indicators of the character of the manu-
facturer's affiliation with the forum state would be the litigational
convenience within the forum court and the forum state's interest in
the matter.
45 Since Say-a-Buck is a large distributor and Hamlan a small manufacturer,
New York is not likely to have a strong interest in protecting its residents by asserting
jurisdiction. See N.Y. Cm. PRAc. LAW § 302(a) 3(i), (ii) (McKinney Supp. 1968-69).
41 In cases where the manufacturer's affiliation with the forum is so attenuated,
the relationship of the middleman to the forum is also frequently vague. Thus the
problem of finding a basis of jurisdiction over the middleman often arises in such cases.
Since the retailer will be a named defendant, both a statutory and a constitutional
basis for jurisdiction must be found. The problem is partially resolved in most states
by statutes authorizing jurisdiction over foreign corporations carrying on regular
and substantial business activities within the state.
A New York statute provides: "A court may exercise such jurisdiction over
persons, property, or status as might have been exercised heretofore." N.Y. Civ.
PRAc. LAW § 301 (McKinney 1963). This apparently includes the power evolved
from Tauza v. Susquehanna Coal Co., 220 N.Y. 259, 115 N.E. 915 (1917), to exer-
cise jurisdiction over a corporation doing business in New York even if the cause of
action did not arise from the conduct of business in New York. More recently,
and especially in light of the due process limitations suggested in International Shoe,
the courts have required "'such a continuous and systematic course of "doing business"
[in this state] as to warrant a finding of its "presence,) in this jurisdiction.'" Frummer
v. Hilton Hotels Int'l, Inc., 19 N.Y.2d 533, 536, 227 N.E2d 851, 853, 281 N.Y.S.2d
41, 43, cert. denied, 389 U.S. 923 (1967); accord, La Belle Creole Int'l, S.A. v.
Attorney-General, 10 N.Y.2d 192, 176 N.E2d 705, 219 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1961).
The current statutory trend, however, is toward denying jurisdictional bases on lia-
bilities unconnected with activities conducted in the forum state unless the defendant is
incorporated under the forum's laws or has its principal place of business there.
See, e.g., UNIFORm INTERSTATE AND INTERNATIONAL PROCEDURE ACT art. I, in 9B
UNIFORM LAws ANNOTATED 305 (1966), which allows jurisdiction in a state in which
a corporation is incorporated or maintains its principal place of business, § 1.02, or in
a state in which the corporation's activities give rise to the cause of action, § 1.03. See
also von Mehren & Trautman, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A Suggested Analysis, 79
HxAv. L. REv. 1121, 1164-79 (1966), in which the authors discuss and endorse the
trend toward jurisdiction based on activities related to the cause of action, described
as "specific jurisdiction."
International Shoe specifically acknowledged that there are cases in which the
continuous activities of a corporation in a state are "so substantial and of such a
nature as to justify suit against it on causes of action arising from dealings entirely
distinct from those activities." 326 U.S. at 318. See also Perkins v. Benquet Consol.
Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952). Thus the presence of 10 Say-a-Buck stores in New
York, although unrelated to the cause of action, serves as a sufficient basis of juris-
diction over Say-a-Buck. Where none of these affiliations is present, the forum might
also gain jurisdiction over the middleman through consent, text accompanying notes
106-08 infra, and, if he is an individual, by domicile, see Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S.
714 (1878) ; cf. Harris v. Balk, 198 U.S. 215 (1905), or by physical presence. See
Peabody v. Hamilton, 106 Mass. 217 (1870) ; cf. Harris v. Balk, 198 U.S. 215 (1905).
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III. FUNCTION, HISTORY, AND CHARACTERISTICS OF VOUCHING
Granting this conclusion that due process indeed limits the UCC's
vouching provision if applied, it is necessary to examine the function,
history, and characteristics of vouching to determine whether there are
any special features of vouching requiring more flexible application of
due process principles.
A. Means of Joining Parties
One of the reasons why the draftsmen incorporated the vouching
provision in the UCC was to avoid the risk of one court trying issues
already decided by another court. Vouching was contemplated as a
method of protecting the judicial system, as well as the middle party,
from the embarrassment of inconsistent determinations. Thus, vouch-
ing avoids inconsistencies by eliminating duplicative judicial activity. 
4 1
Other benefits accruing from the use of vouching, as with collateral
estoppel,4" include conservation of judicial energy and encouragement of
interested parties to bring all evidence and arguments to a single forum.
Other joinder devices have had the benefit of less restrictive due
process limitations, so the draftsmen's hope that vouching would provide
an end run around jurisdictional due process limitations was not un-
precedented. The federal interpleader statute is an excellent example.
Interpleader is designed for situations in which a number of parties do,
or may, claim an interest to the same money or property in the hands
of a third party.49 Typical cases involve an insurance company or a
trustee acting as stakeholder, faced with conflicting demands to the stake
made by a number of individuals in various states. Without inter-
pleader, the stakeholder might have to answer to separate suits in dif-
ferent states.50 Each state could decide that its claimant is solely en-
titled to the money or property, resulting in the stakeholder's multiple
liability. Because most of the claimants will be individuals who ordi-
47 Another device designed to protect the federal judicial system from this
kind of inequity can be found in the federal interpleader statute, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1335,
2361 (1964).
48 Indeed many courts and commentators have attempted to justify the rule in
terms of collateral estoppel doctrines, often straining conventional notions of privity
to do so. See, e.g., Thomas v. Ferriss, 113 Conn. 539, 542-43, 155 A. 829, 830-31
(1931); Maddocks v. Gushee, 120 Me. 247, 248, 113 A. 300, 301 (1921); Comment,
Sales Law--The "Vouching Iv" Provision of the Uniform Commercial Code, 36 CONN.
B.J. 288, 289 (1962). Some courts went so far as to deny application of the rule to per-
sonal property cases where there was a lack of conventional privity. See Booth v.
Scheer, 105 Kan. 643, 185 P. 900 (1919) ; Comment, Judgments-Conclusiveness of
Judgment as Against Persons Liable Over to Original Defendant-Applicability to
Cases of Resale of Defective Chattels, 40 Mice. L. REv. 872 (1942).
t9 28 U.S.C. § 1335 (1964) gives original jurisdiction to the district courts of "any
civil action of interpleader or in the nature of interpleader filed by any person, firm,
or corporation" which has in its possesson money or property worth $500 or more
if "[t]wo or more adverse claimants, of diverse citizenship . . ., are claiming or may
claim to be entitled to such money or property" and if the plaintiff has deposited the
money or property with the court or has given bond.
60 See, e.g., New York Life Ins. Co. v. Dunlevy, 241 U.S. 518 (1916).
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narily cannot be brought within the jurisdiction of any one forum, there
is no way, aside from interpleader, for the stakeholder to protect himself.
The existence of federal interpleader legislation authorizing nation-
wide service of process 5- may lead some to believe that both the danger
of inconsistent results and concern for litigational convenience of other
parties justify loosening due process limitations on vouching. However,
there are two major distinctions between the federal interpleader statute
and the Uniform Commercial Code's vouching section. First, a state
statute extending a state's jurisdictional reach beyond its borders cannot
be equated with a federal statute extending the jurisdiction of a federal
court outside the territorial limits of its forum state. The constitutional
limitations on a state's jurisdictional reach differ from those placed on
the federal government 2 Congress's authorization of jurisdiction was
a response to a specific federal problem,5 3 not the product of a state's
attempt to extend extraterritorially its power to determine the rights and
liabilities of foreign persons." Although the use in federal interpleader
cases of the choice of law rule of the state in which the district court
sits r5 may give that particular state's law an otherwise unwarranted and
extraterritorial effect, the state has not legislated the power to itself. 6
51 See 28 U.S.C. § 2361 (1964) ; cf. 28 U.S.C. § 1335 (1964) ; FED. R. Civ. P. 4(f).
5 2 See 3A J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRAcTicE 22.04[2], at 3023-24 (2d ed. 1953)
[hereinafter cited as MOORE] ; cf. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958) ; Pennoyer
v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1878). For a comparison of differing federal and state jurisdic-
tional issues, compare McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957) with
South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 331-32 (1966) and Glidden Co. v. Zdanok,
370 U.S. 530, 543-52 (1962).
53 Early interpleader legislation, e.g., Act of Feb. 22, 1917, ch. 113, 39 Stat. 929,
was a reaction to the result in cases like New York Life Ins. Co. v. Dunlevy, 241 U.S.
518 (1916). See 53 CoNG. REc. 9443-44 (1916). In the Dunlevy case, 1 of the 2
claimants to insurance proceeds sued the insurance company in Pennsylvania, which
purported to allow the insurance company to interplead the other claimant, who re-
sided in California. After Pennsylvania found for the first claimant, the second sued
the insurance company in California. The Supreme Court held that the Pennsylvania
judgment was not binding on the California claimant because that court had no juris-
diction over her, thus opening the company to double liability. See Chafee, Interstate
Interpleader, 33 YALE L.J. 685, 711 (1924).
It must be kept in mind, however, that the legislation did not overrule the holding
of Dunlevy that Pennsylvania could not interplead the nonresident claimant. Congress's
response was to provide federal interpleader in federal courts. See 3A MOORE ir 22.04
[2], at 3023-24.
54 Cf., e.g., Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958) ; Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S.
714 (1878).
55 See, e.g., Davis v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 279 F2d 304 (9th Cir. 1960) ; Williams
v. McFerrin, 242 F.2d 53 (5th Cir. 1957).
56 Cf. New York Life Ins. Co. v. Dunlevy, 241 U.S. 518 (1916). But see Atkinson
v. Superior Court, 49 Cal. 2d 338, 316 P2d 960 (1957), cert. denied, 357 U.S. 569
(1958), in which Judge Traynor questioned Dunlevy. He did not think that the
federal-state question affected the due process issue:
It is doubtful whether today the United States Supreme Court would deny
to a state court the interstate interpleader jurisdiction that federal courts may
exercise. A remedy that a federal court may provide without violating due
process of law does not become unfair or unjust because it is sought in a state
court instead.
Id. at 348, 316 P.2d at 966.
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Second, vouching is much more analogous to impleader than to
interpleader."7 Impleader applies to the kind of factual situation in the
hypotheticals: one party (the consumer) sues a second (the retailer) on
a claim for which a third party (the manufacturer) may be liable over."8
If the retailer or middleman encounters contradictory results in two
separate suits, he may bear full liability unless all parties are amenable
to the jurisdiction of a single forum, so that he can join or bind the
third-party manufacturer to the consumer's suit. 9 However, in inter-
pleader the defendant is not seeking to enforce a right of indemnity but
a guarantee that he will not have to pay twice. There is more reason
to allow nation-wide service of process if one not at fault is attempting
to avoid double liability than if one at fault is trying to shift the liability
to another.
Impleader subsumes the historical purposes of vouching 0 and fits
more neatly into the hiatus which vouching was originally designed to
fill. It brings in the absent party as a named defendant and binds him on
all legal and factual matters relating to the cause of action. However,
the availability of state or federal impleader depends on the forum's
acquisition of jurisdiction over all three parties," and this may not
always be possible. For example, had the retailers tried to implead the
manufacturers in the above hypotheticals, at least one would have failed.
Recognizing these due process limitations on impleader in multistate
situations, the draftsmen of the Code introduced the ancient practice of
vouching. As mentioned earlier, the impact of the vouching provision
was intended for just those cases in which due process prevents the
The court did not base its holding on this statement, however; jurisdiction was sus-
tained on the strength of California's contacts with the case, an approach repudiated
by the Supreme Court a year later in Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958)
(decided at the same time certiorari was denied in Atkinson). A state "does not
acquire . . . jurisdiction by being the 'center of gravity' of the controversy, or the
most convenient location for litigation. The issue is personal jurisdiction, not choice
of law [nor center of gravity]." Id. at 254.
The results in these 2 cases can be harmonized on the differences between the
acts of the 2 trustees. In Atkinson, the nonresident trustee had knowingly and actively
affiliated itself with California by becoming trustee of funds paid by California
employees to their California employers pursuant to an agreement made by their
California union. The issue concerned the disposition of these funds in the hands
of the employers, who had attempted to interplead the trustees. In Hanson, the
trustee became passively affiliated with Florida when the settlor changed her residence.
See also 3A MooRE 122.04[2], at 3026-28.
5 See 3 Moo.Ea 14.02[1], at 431-32.
58 The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure describe the typical impleader situation
under "Third-Party Practice":
At any time after the commencement of the action a defending party, as a
third-party plaintiff, may cause a summons and complaint to be served upon
a person not a party to the action who is or may be liable to him for all or
part of the plaintiff's claim against him.
FED. R. Civ. P. 14(a).
69 See 3 MooRE f[ 14.27, 14.28 [1], at 721-41.
60 Text accompanying notes 63-89 infra.
61FED. R. Civ. P. 4(f), 14; 3 MooRE 1428 [1].
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use of impleader.' However, an examination of the history of vouch-
ing indicates no justification for such a position.
B. Vouching, from the Middle Ages to the Uniform Commercial Code
People have been vouching in other people since the middle ages.
3
Section 2-607 (5) (a) of the Uniform Commercial Code is a codification
and extension of a venerable practice which has its roots in what Lord
Coke described as "one of the most curious and cunning learnings of
the law." " Although its earliest usage involved ownership of movable
property,6 vouching first became an established device in cases involv-
ing title to real property, 6 and operated where one party challenged the
validity of another's title to land. The possessor could bring into the
action the person from whom he received the land, a process called
"vouching to warranty," which amounted to issuing a summons in the
form of a writ of warranty. 7 Unless the summoned party could show
that he had no obligation to warrant the title," he had the duty to de-
fend or replace the property.
This duty was not a contractual obligation arising from the sale
of something for value. Rather, it reflected an ancient relationship
created by a conveyance of land:
The feudal warranty is, doubtless, derived from the ancient
duty of the feudal lord to protect his leige man "with fire and
102 Text accompanying notes 7-10, 57 supra.
63 The term "vouching," apparently derived from Anglo-Saxon laws adopted as
early as 685 A.D., described a situation in which a person who had lost possession of
movable property brought an action akin to theft, for recovery and compensation
against its present possessor. If the latter had purchased the property and received
a warranty from his seller, he was permitted to "vouch to warranty at the king's
hall, if he can, and . . .bring thither the person who sold it to him .I..." 1 B.
THORPE, ANCIENT LAWS AND INSTITUTES OF ENGLAND 31, 35 (1840).
A formal oath accompanied the practice:
By the Lord, I was not at rede not at deed, neither counsellor nor doer,
where were unlawfully led away N's cattle. But as I cattle have, so did I
lawfully obtain it. And: as I vouch it to warranty, so did he sell it to me
into whose hand I now set it. And: as I cattle have, so did he sell it to me
who had it to sell. And: as I cattle have, so did it come of my own property,
and so lay folk-right my own possession is, and my rearing.
Id. 179, 181. Once the seller-warrantor was brought before the court and his liability
admitted, he incurred the responsibility of defending against the plaintiff. 2 W.
HOLDsWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 113 (4th ed. 1936).
64 See 4 J. KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AmERICAN LAW 458 (1st ed. 1830).
05 See Note, Development of the Common Law Rule Making a .udgment Con-
clusive Against Warrantors and Indemnitors, 34 VA. L. REv. 321, 322 (1948) [herein-
after cited as Note, 34 VA. L. REv.]. This is an interesting and scholarly study of the
history of vouching. See also Comment, Sales Law-The "Vouching In" Provisiont of
the Uniform Commercial Code, 36 CONN. B.J. 288, 288-89 (1962).
I6 The demise of the practice in movable property cases has been attributed to the
forbidding formalities which surrounded its use and the concurrent development of
personal actions. See Note, 34 VA. L. REv. 322.
67 E. JENxS, A SHORT HISTORY OF THE ENGLISH LAW 110 (1st ed. 1912).
68 For the limited cases in which a feoffor had no obligation to warrant, see id.
109-13. Jenks says that in asserting this defense the feoffor "subjects himself to a kind
of interlocutory lawsuit, possibly ending in a duel, with the feoffee." Id. 110.
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sword against all deadly." It was of the essence of the feudal
bond, that the vassal should be under his lord's protection.
69
This may explain why no express promise to defend was necessary.
The obligation was so imbedded in the nature of the relationship be-
tween feoffor and feoffee that its articulation would have been super-
fluous and its denial unthinkable. If the third party was held to be
entitled to the land because of superior title, the feoffee executed a writ
of warrantia clirtae and recovered from the feoffor and his heirs other
lands of equal value.7" Thus, vouching originally arose in real property
actions and grew from its roots within the relationship between feoffor
and feoffee into a device which reinforced this fundamental relationship
by forcing the feoffor to defend the title given to his feoffee.
When personal actions-and the beginnings of modern common
law principles-emerged, real actions with their cumbersome techni-
calities began to sink, taking the real warranty with them.7 About
that time, English settlors brought a confused and transitional body of
law to the American colonies. The last vestiges of the real warranty
immigrated with them in the form of the real covenant, an express
personal obligation to "warrant and defend," 72 which often appeared in
deeds as an attempt to create the old legal relationship in the context of
personal actions.73 Although it never enjoyed popularity in England,
this practice thrived in America where it provided a precedent for
modern common law vouching.74
The modern rule of vouching was a response to the problem created
when a covenantor or warrantor of title refused to comply with his
promise to defend a suit challenging the purchaser's title.75 If the court
found the purchaser's title inferior, and the forsaken purchaser brought
a subsequent action against the seller,70 the seller could raise the very
69 Id. 109. As feudal symbolism lost touch with social reality, an express obliga-
tion to "acquit and defend" was required by statute in order to bind the heirs of the
original feoffor. However, the obligation of the original feoffor was still implied.
See Note, 34 VA. L. Ray. 323.
'7O See 4 J. KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AEmCAN LAW 457-59 (1st ed. 1830).
71 See generally Note, 34 VA. L. RFv. 326-27.
7 2 See, e.g., the covenant involved in Hamilton v. Cutts, 4 Mass. 349 (1808):
"to warrant and defend the granted premises to the [grantee], his heirs and
assigns forever against the lawful claims of all people." Id. at 350.
73 See Note, 34 VA. L. REv. 330 & nn.70-72.
74See id.
'75 This response also appeared where an indemnification or surety agreement was
involved. See, e.g., Masser v. Strickland, 17 S. & R. 354 (Pa. 1828). The enforce-
ment of these agreements, historically within equity jurisdiction, has a long and
interesting history which parallels that of vouching for title. See Note, 34 VA. L. REv.
323-26.76 Allowing this second action for breach of covenant presented its own problems
in the transitional period. A recovery by the third party against the feoffee under
the real warranty system gave the feoffee an immediate right to other land of equal
value held by his feoffor. See 4 J. KENT, COMMENTA=S ON AmERICAN LAW 457-58
(1st ed. 1830). In the context of personal actions, plaintiffs attempted to redeem
their loss through an action for damages resulting from breach of the covenant war-
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issues on which the purchaser's title had first been defeated. Courts
recognized that a person might be caught in the middle of two judicial
decisions, one denying him the property" he purchased on the ground
that the seller lacked good title and the second denying him damages on
the ground that his seller had good title, with the result that "he would
lose both land and money." 7s The response 79 was a rule that where a
seller, either expressly or by operation of law, warrants title to his buyer
and the buyer is later sued by a third party claiming paramount title,
the seller will be bound by the results of the suit provided he received
adequate notice of his opportunity to defend and there was no fraud
or collusion."'
Title cases are particularly appropriate for a rule binding a war-
rantor, because of the strong likelihood that if the warrantor chooses
not to defend, the warrantee will attempt to defend the title as well as
he possibly can. The suit invariably involves the single issue whether
the warrantor had good title, and there are few acceptable explanations
for leaving the warrantee in the middle of inconsistent holdings. How-
ever, these considerations do not apply in situations where the war-
rantee's title is not at stake."-
ranting title. Although the defendants resisted on the grounds that the ancient (but
admittedly obsolete) system allowed no such action, the courts recognized that failure
to allow the action would render the covenant meaningless.
Since the ancient remedies became obsolete it is in vain to tell a tenant he can
have them, for he cannot; why therefore should he not recover the value
in an action of covenant? If he cannot; and if the ancient remedies are now
gone, how passing strange it will be that here is a solemn covenanta, right
but no remedy I
Chapman v. Holmes, 10 N.J.L. 20, 31-32 (Sup. Ct. 1828).
77 The application of the rule was generally limited to title uses but not necessarily
title to land. See, e.g., Edwards v. Beard, 211 Ala. 251, 100 So. 101 (1924) (corn)
Thomas v. Ferriss, 113 Conn. 539, 155 A. 829 (1931) (car).
78 Bender v. Fromberger, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 436, 437 (Pa. 1806).
79 Pennsylvania, the first jurisdiction to move toward the modern rule, rested its
earliest decision on the court's sense of fairness without relying on the precedent of
real covenants. Although the facts of the case, Bender v. Fromberger, 4 U.S. (4
Dall.) 436 (Pa. 1806), differ from the protoype situation where the covenantor refuses
to participate in the defense, the equities are similar. The defendant had sold a tract
of land to the plaintiff, covenanting that he was conveying good title. A third
party, claiming superior title, succeeded in an ejectment action against the plaintiff,
and the defendant took part in the defense and acceded to the settlement of the case.
The plaintiff then brought an action in covenant against the defendant, and the major
question of the case involved rules of pleading and damages. In the course of trial,
the defendant attempted to prove that his title was good after all, and the plaintiff
objected that such evidence was inadmissible because the issue had been settled in the
previous suit. Citing no authority on this point but noting the plaintiff's difficult
position if the defendant proved good title, the court unanimously agreed that the
defendant could not introduce the evidence. Id. at 436-37. Several American jurisdic-
tions seem to have developed the rule independently. Note, 34 VA. L. REv. 330-31; see,
e.g., Bender v. Fromberger, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 436 (Pa. 1806) ; Hamilton v. Cutts, 4
Mass. 349, 353 (1808) (dictum). See also Duffield v. Scott, 100 Eng. Rep. 628 (K.B.
1789). Later formulations of the rule appear in E. I. DuPont De Nemours & Co. v.
Richmond Guano Co., 297 F. 580 (4th Cir. 1924) ; Edwards v. Beard, 211 Ala. 251, 100
So. 101 (1924) ; Thomas v. Ferriss, 113 Conn. 539, 155 A. 829 (1931); Maddocks v.
Gushee, 120 Me. 247, 113 A. 300 (1921).
80 Cases cited note 79 supra.
8 1 Notes 95-102 infra & accompanying text.
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Section 2-607(5) (a) of the Uniform Commercial Code codifies
the modern rule and extends the scope of its operation well beyond
warranties of title."2 The legislative history of the provision, which
helps one assess the role its draftsmen saw for it, reveals that the 1950
Proposed Final Draft of the Uniform Commercial Code coupled a
vouching provision with impleader: "
(1) Where a buyer resells and is sued for any breach with
regard to which he would have an action over against his
seller he may
(a) implead his seller in like manner and with like effect
as is or may be provided in the [Rules of Civil Procedure
of this State] [Federal Rules of Civil Procedure] ; or
(b) seasonably notify to [sic] his seller to come in and
defend the action.
(2) Failure of a seller to defend after receiving such notifi-
cation renders any adverse judgment in the action conclusive
against him and makes him liable for all costs of the action
including reasonable attorney's fees."4
This provision was deleted before publication of the 1951 Proposed
Final Draft Number Two. 5 Although the reasons prompting the de-
letion are not officially set forth, it closely followed criticism by those
who thought that the states' acceptance of the important substantive
reforms of the Code would be jeopardized by additional procedural
reforms."8 There was also opposition from manufacturers who saw
both vouching and impleader as part of a statutory scheme to liberalize
the privity doctrine.
87
82 See, e.g., Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. J. R. Clark Co., 239 Minn. 511, 59 N.W.2d
899 (1953); London Guarantee & Accident Co. v. Strait Scale Co., 322 Mo. 502,
513-14, 15 S.W2d 766, 770 (1929). See also Degnan & Barton, mtpra note 6, at 473-76.
Earlier attempts to extend vouching beyond issues of title were largely rejected by
the courts. See Booth v. Scheer, 105 Kan. 643, 646-47, 185 P. 898, 900 (1919) (sale of
horse) ; Smith & Melton v. Moore, 7 S.C. 209, 223-24 (1876) (sale of cotton). The
extension of this innovation into the area of quality warranties and a study of the
common law precedent for it are discussed in Degnan & Barton, .epra note 6, at 473-76.
3 For a description of impleader, see text accompanying notes 57-62 supra.
8 4 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-718 (1950 Proposed Final Draft). The lan-
guage relating to impleader by the buyer is substantially the same as that in Uniform
Revised Sales Act § 120 (1947 version). By 1948, with the drafting of the Uniform
Commercial Code well underway, the Code of Commercial Law included in § 119
authorization for both impleader and vouching.
85 See UN nox COMMERCIAL CODE (1951 Proposed Final Draft No. 2).
SoSee, e.g., Degnan & Barton, supra note 6, at 471-73.
87Id. 472. A vouching provision did, however, appear in article 3 (Com-
mercial Paper) of the 1952 Official Text. UNIFOR COMMERCIAL CODE § 3-803 (1952
version). The section provided:
In any action on any instrument a defendant may give seasonable written
notice to any third person who is or may be liable on the instrument to the
plaintiff or the defendant, advising such person of his right to intervene and
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In the 1956 Recommendations of the Editorial Board for the Uni-
form Commercial Code, the article 2 vouching provision reappeared
without accompaniment of either impleader or much controversy .8  The
move was prompted by the New York State Patent Bar, which had
taken a lively interest in using article 2 as a vehicle for reforming the
law of infringement.8 9
An examination of the history, then, reveals nothing that might
exempt vouching from the normal application of due process restric-
tions. It traditionally operated within the confines of a relationship
close in terms of both distance and mutual dependence, and it was not
designed to solve problems of distant warrantors or impersonal rela-
tions. There is no historical reason why the draftsmen of the UCC
should have felt that this provision could be more useful for their pur-
poses than impleader or any other joinder device. Without any histor-
ical foundation for the draftsmen's supposition, one must then examine
the characteristics of vouching to see if something unique in its operation
might allow a more flexible application of due process standards.
C. The Impact of the Vouching Provision on Due Process
1. Limitation to Factual Determinations
Discussion of jurisdictional due process centered on the relation-
ship between the manufacturer's activities and the forum state. The
Supreme Court in Hanson v. Denckla stated that if a defendant's activi-
ties do not display a purposeful affiliation with the forum state, assump-
tion of jurisdiction over him violates due process." Although Hanson
involved an attempted assumption of jurisdiction over a nonresident
in a multiple party situation, there are differences between Hanson and
the cases in which vouching would operate that may mitigate the fin-
fairness of binding the vouched in party to the determinations of the
forum. Also, intrinsic limitations on vouching may so reduce unfairness
to the manufacturer that his purposeful affiliation with the forum is no
longer required to satisfy due process.
In Hanson, the issue before the Florida court was whether a stun
of money had been effectively appointed by the settlor or whether it
passed under the residuary clause of her will, which in turn depended
on whether Florida's unusual "republication" rule applied. The facts
that he will be concluded by any decision rendered. . . . Any person so
notified may intervene in the action, but even if he does not intervene is con-
cluded as to any issue of fact therein determined.
This section has been retained, with some changes in wording, in the present version
of the Code.
8 8 UNIRM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-607(5) (b) (1956 Recommendations of the
Editorial Board) ; see Degnan & Barton, supra note 6, at 472.
8 9The extensive participation of the patent bar is recorded in Naw YORK LAW
REVISIONS COMMISSION, STUDY OF THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE: MEMORANDA
PRESENTED TO THE COMMITTEE AND STENOGRAPHIC REPORT oN ARTICLE 2 OF THE
CODE, Legis. Doc. No. 65(B) (1954). Also see Degnan & Barton, supra note 6, at 473.
90 See 357 U.S. at 253.
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were undisputed, and the court was limited to determining their legal
implications." The vouching provision of the Code, however, confines
the binding effect of the forum's adjudicatory power to factual deter-
minations common to the consumer's claim against the middleman and
the middleman's subsequent claim against the manufacturer." This
limitation to factual determinations provokes, in three areas, consider-
ation of the tension between due process and the vouching provision.
a. Choice of Law
The first concern is choice of law. Due process restrictions serve
in part to protect a defendant from a foreign state's unjustified applica-
tion, according to its choice of law rules, of a law favorable to a resident
plaintiff. If the manufacturer's state would apply a law favorable to the
manufacturer, then, regardless of which forum adjudicates, the foreign
party is denied the protection afforded by his state. When choosing be-
tween residences, the application of due process standards would prevent
a court from making an arbitrary assumption of jurisdiction over the
manufacturer by requiring that he have at least minimal contacts with
the forum state. This requirement, and the potential for unfairness
resulting from the exercise of a state's choice of law rules, helps explain
the purposeful affiliation test articulated in Hanson.
However, when the forum's adjudicatory power over the manu-
facturer is based on the Uniform Commercial Code's vouching provision,
should that section's limitation to factual determinations be regarded as
a self-contained safeguard calling for easing the restrictions on juris-
diction? Certainly the jurisdiction granted through vouching permits
only a narrow extension of the forum's power to adjudicate or to render
a decision unfair to the manufacturer.
But authority to determine the facts is of no small consequence;
it can leave the manufacturer in a position where the most favorable
legal rules cannot salvage him. The presentation and finding of facts
are subject to the forum's "procedural" rules of evidentiary privileges,
burden of proof presumptions, pleading, hearsay, and summary judg-
ments. Asserting the propriety of a forum's application of rules desig-
nated procedural does not mitigate the potential for unfairness.93 The
question remains, as in the context of substantive laws, whether it is
fair or proper to require the manufacturer to appear before the forum
in the first place.
91See 100 So2d 378, 380 (1956).
92 T J1IpORM CoMMRcr CODE § 2-607(5) (a), reproduced at text accompanying
note 1 supra.
93 See, e.g., Sampson v. Channell, 110 F2d 754 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 310 U.S.
650 (1940), in which the incidence of burden of proof was found to be so closely
intertwined with the plaintiff's substantive right of recovery that the federal court
had to apply state rather than federal law, even though the state classified burden of
proof as a procedural rule.
1969]
262 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol.118:237
Furthermore, a general verdict may not detail what facts were
found or upon what legal theories such findings were based." Besides
the problems this poses for the uniform administration of the vouching
provision, the vagueness of these uninformative verdicts belies a con-
tention that the language of the Code effectively factors out problems
tied to the forum's substantive law. For example, assume that in the
first hypothetical situation (the Bar-Be-Safe case), the manufacturer
refuses the opportunity to defend. In the consumer's suit against the
department store, the jury is charged, in accordance with the forum's
law, that if the plaintiff disregards clear instructions printed on the
label and if the instructions are printed in a prominent place, then the
retailer is absolved of liability. Assume further that the plaintiff argues,
and the retailer denies, that the instructions on the can of Bar-Be-Safe
("Can be used on open flame. Best results obtained when applied
sparingly.") were both unclear and not prominent. Following a general
verdict for the plaintiff, the retailer brings an action against the manu-
facturer in the latter's jurisdiction which allows recovery unless the
instructions on the label are clear. Under the vouching provision, can
the manufacturer relitigate the question whether the instructions were
clear? If not, the first forum's substantive law may have bound him
if the jury found only that the instructions were not prominently placed.
Thus, significant choice of law problems remain when jurisdiction is
sustained under the vouching provision.
b. Coincident Interests in Defense
The Code's vouching provision may appear to mitigate unfairness
to an absent defendant insofar as the retailer and the manufacturer share
coincident interests. That is, in most circumstances the retailer desires
to defeat the consumer on whatever grounds possible, including most
of those which the manufacturer would raise. Shared defenses include
the absence of defects in the goods, contributory negligence on the part
of the consumer, unforeseeability of damages, and lack of warranty.
But the appearance of mitigating unfairness is not enough to
satisfy due process."5 The interests shared by the manufacturer and the
middleman are limited to defenses which can successfully leave the
entire loss with the consumer. In almost all other cases the real inter-
ests of the manufacturer and the middleman do not coincide. 6
94 Of course in some cases it will be possible to learn more specifically the
grounds for decision through a special interrogatory or a finding by the judge. See
Degnan & Barton, supra note 6, at 485-87, in which the authors discuss the relationship
of this area to the rules of res judicata concerning "mediate data" and "ultimate fact."
95 But see Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 263 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
96 A notable exception is the case in which a buyer of goods is sued by a party
claiming paramount title. Before the Code, vouching was generally limited to cases
where the vouched in party had warranted title or undertook the responsibilities of an
indemnifier, notes 75-81 mtpra & accompanying text, but the Code expanded the use
of the device to include cases in which the seller is liable over on "a warranty or
other obligation." UNIFORM CoMMancrr CODE § 2-607(5).
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For example, in the water heater case (the second hypothetical
situation), assume that the Grays' complaint alleges American Radi-
ator's liability on two theories: first, the metal used in the casing of the
safety valve was defective and violated American's implied warranty
of fitness; second, American Radiator employees had broken the valve
by negligently dropping the water heater while carrying it into the
Grays' basement. Assume further that Titan, the valve manufacturer,
elects not to defend. American, realizing that Titan will be bound by
the factual determinations and recognizing the difficulty of contesting
both theories of liability, will be tempted to present a more vigorous
defense against the second charge. If American is liable only on the
first theory determined by a special interrogatory, American then can
bring an action against Titan in Ohio claiming that Titan is bound by
the determination that the casing was defective. 97  Or suppose that the
Grays' complaint rests entirely on the theory that the casing was de-
fective. Secure in its knowledge that Titan will bear the ultimate liabil-
ity, American's defense may be half-hearted at best.
Some courts, recognizing this dilemma (although not its consti-
tutional implications), have said that in order to bind the manufacturer
the middleman must conduct a "full dress, arm's length, good faith
adversary proceeding" in the initial suit.9s Significantly, however, these
remarks arise in cases approaching the extremes of potential abuse.
For example, in Stewart & Foulke, Inc. v. Robertshaw Controls Co.,99
the first court entered judgment in the amount of a settlement between
the retailer and the consumer, and the retailer then tried to bind the
manufacturer to the judgment. And in Grummons v. Zollinger,100 the
manufacturer was able to prove collusion between the retailer and the
consumer. But it is often difficult to prove collusion or more subtle
variations of bad faith, such as a unilateral decision by the retailer to
9 7 The corresponding danger to the middleman when the manufacturer does defend
is equally troublesome. Suppose the manufacturer undertakes the middleman's defense
under these circumstances and puts up a strong defense on the claims which would
leave him ultimately liable, while offering less resistance on the theories which exonerate
the middleman, so that if any liability is found, the middleman will be held responsible.
This possibility poses a difficult question for the middleman deciding whether or not
to vouch in the manufacturer. If he does and the manufacturer accepts, he runs
the risk described; if he does not, he will have to relitigate the issues. See Degnan
& Barton, supra note 6, at 490-91, in which the authors seem to suggest that if the
manufacturer agrees to defend, the middleman must be permitted to participate in the
defenses which would exonerate him. They also mention that sometimes middlemen
attempt to include in the vouching letter the condition that if the manufacturer
assumes the defense, he also must assume any liability found against the middleman,
a device upheld in a pre-Code case, Hoskins v. Hotel Randolph Co., 203 Iowa 1152,
1162, 211 N.W. 423, 428 (1926), cert. denied, 275 U.S. 566 (1927). Degnan and
Barton do not raise the problems of justifying such a condition under the language
of § 2-607(5) (a) but think that it is "unconscionable and probably unconstitutional."
Degnan & Barton, supra note 6, at 492.
98 Stewart & Foulke, Inc. v. Robertshaw Controls Co., 397 F. 2d 971, 972 (5th
Cir. 1968) ; accord, Grummons v. Zollinger, 341 F.2d 464 (7th Cir. 1965), affg 240
F. Supp. 63 (N.D. Ind. 1964).
99 397 F2d 971 (5th Cir. 1968) (judgment for manufacturer).
"O 341 F2d 464 (7th Cir. 1965).
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present a weak defense to issues on which the manufacturer will be ulti-
mately liable.' °' Thus, in cases in which the plaintiff cannot be de-
feated outright, the middleman may with impunity refuse to represent
fairly the manufacturer's interests.
Nevertheless, there may be cases in which the middleman does not
share the manufacturer's interests, and yet the middleman will present
an acceptable defense. When the middleman is a large corporation, the
manufacturer a small company, and the claim substantial (the third
hypothetical situation), a middleman may fear that the manufacturer
will be unable to bear the ultimate liability. In these cases the middle-
man will find it in his best interest to pursue aggressively every line
of defense against the consumer. These also tend to be the cases in
which the forum is unlikely to have jurisdiction over the manufacturer
since the middleman's extensive distribution system will extend beyond
the scope of the manufacturer's ordinary course of business. In this
situation, the theory that the retailer's pursuit of coincident interests
mitigates unfairness to an out of state defendant may justify assumption
of jurisdiction by vouching. However, it must be recognized that the
retailer's efforts on the manufacturer's behalf are motivated solely by
the retailer's fear of an adverse judgment which the manufacturer can-
not bear. Absent such fear, the retailer may not adequately defend the
manufacturer's interests. When the manufacturer is large enough to
absorb the liability, but not large enough to make jurisdiction likely
under ordinary due process standards, the retailer will not be motivated
to defend the manufacturer's interests strongly. Nevertheless, the
vouching provision of the UCC purports to bind the manufacturer. In
these situations, infringements on due process are most likely to occur,
and these are the very cases for which the Code's vouching provision
was designed.'
c. Centrality of Forum--Judicial Economy
A discussion of the relationship between vouching and due process
must include a third area-judicial economy-which is affected only
indirectly by limiting vouching to factual determinations. In a vouching
situation, only two of the three major parties involved in the dispute-
the consumer and the middleman-will be before the court, unless the
manufacturer has decided to defend. The consumer's injury probably
has occurred in the forum state where the crucial witnesses will often
be located. If the forum does not have jurisdiction over the manu-
facturer, and vouching is not allowed, the middleman may have to
retry the case in another state to recover from the manufacturer. This
101 Cf. Hessler v. Hillwood Mfg. Co., 302 F2d 61 (6th Cir. 1962), in which the
court rejected the contention that the defense in the first action was unskillful, noting
that "there was no claim of fraud, collusion or bad faith" on the part of the attorneys,
and that because the vouched in manufacturer had declined to defend, he could not be
heard to complain of the manner of representation in the first action.
LO2 Text accompanying notes 7-10 & 61-62 supra.
[Vol.l18:237
VOUCHING
will result in duplication of judicial effort, inconvenience, and added
cost to the middleman. Also, the possibility exists that the second
forum will find facts differing from those found by the first, thus leaving
the middleman with contradictory decisions.
Although these considerations are strong, they do not satisfy the
demands of due process or legitimate an otherwise unconstitutional
assumption of jurisdiction over the manufacture.Y" This is so because
litigational convenience is only of supplementary impact on the consti-
tutional level, and because at any rate it is not at all certain that the
crucial witnesses may be found within the forum state. Even though
the events surrounding the incident may have occurred in the forum
state, many of the manufacturer's and the middleman's defenses may
arise from events which have occurred in states with which the manu-
facturer is more directly affiliated. In the second hypothetical, evidence
(such as express warranties made by American Radiator and installation
in the Grays' home) relating to the explosion of the water heater will be
found in Illinois. Suppose, however, that the complaint alleges Ameri-
can Radiator's negligence in using Titan valves because of Titan's
reputation for inferior manufacturing standards, inadequate testing of
valve components, and production of unsafe valves. American might
further be charged with failure to have adequate testing procedures of
its own and with use of safety valves of insufficient capacity for the type
of heater bought by the Grays. The witnesses and evidence necessary
to defeat these contentions-plant personnel, insurance company in-
spectors, company engineers, other customers, and inspection and test-
ing reports-are likely to be in Ohio. Admittedly, distribution of rele-
vant witnesses and evidence will vary with the facts and allegations
of each case. Where this distribution indicates substantial affiliation
of the manufacturer with the forum, the forum's assumption of jurisdic-
tion could be justified on grounds of convenience." 4 However, any gen-
eralization that witnesses in vouching cases will be found in the original
forum has too many exceptions to justify the continental sweep of the
vouching provision. The constitutionally imposed restraints on state
court jurisdiction arise from concerns about fairness to the defendant
and the reach of each state's adjudicatory power. 15 When virtually all
the relevant evidence is in the state asserting jurisdiction, the first
forum's assumption of jurisdiction over the manufacturer is permissible
in light of the minimal unfairness to him, whether or not vouching is
employed. But if evidence and witnesses are just as likely to be dis-
persed among the potential forums, and varying procedural and choice
of law rules can produce differing results in different forums, unfairness
to the manufacturer remains unmitigated.
'03 But cf. Atkinson v. Superior Court, 49 Cal. 2d 338, 347-48, 316 P2d 960, 966
(1957), cert. denied, 357 U.S. 569 (1958).
04See, e.g., International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
105See Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958); text accompanying notes
16-18 supra.
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2. Theories of Waiver
Other arguments favoring extended use of the Code's vouching
provision can be made. First, one could argue that vouching is a con-
tract term implied by the Code into every contract for the sale of goods.
If a manufacturer warrants the quality of goods sold to a middleman
and knowingly consents in the contract to defend the middleman in a
foreign forum against claims arising from failure of the goods to have
that quality, allowing the foreign forum to assume jurisdiction over him
does not violate due process." 6 This theory is based on a general policy
favoring private contractual freedom. The reasoning underlying this
theory concludes that since the defendant anticipated the forum's juris-
diction at the time of sale and willingly agreed to submit to its juris-
diction, allowing jurisdiction over him is not unfair.1 7  The argument
is more convincing when it is stated in terms that suggest the parties,
not the state, extend the reach of the state's power.
However, implying consent from the Code in the absence of an
explicit contract provision is an unjustified fiction. The manufacturer
has merely sold goods. He has not in any real sense agreed to under-
take his buyer's defense in a foreign forum. None of the justifica-
tions for allowing jurisdiction to be determined by private agreement
at the time of sale 1S obtains when the "agreement" is a contract term
implied by state law into every sale of goods. Rarely will a manu-
facturer realize that each sale of his products to a middleman contains
such a term. It is neither the result of his bargaining nor a factor in
his planning. The manufacturer has not willingly waived his due
process protection from foreign forums. The state has attempted to do
it for him by two sentences buried in the Uniform Commercial Code.
106 Cf. National Equip. Rental Ltd. v. Szukhent, 375 U.S. 311, 316 (1964). This
case seems badly decided on its facts: a New York corporation engaged in leasing farm
equipment had provided for jurisdiction in New York as a term in a printed leasing
agreement. The defendants were 2 farmers from Michigan. See id. at 326, 334 (Black
& Brennan, JJ., dissenting). See also Kenny Construction Co. v. Allen, 248 F2d
656 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
10 7 See A. voN MEHiREN & D. TRAUTMAN, THE LAW OF MULTISTATE PROBLEMS
662 (1965). The authors have serious reservations about permitting jurisdiction
simply on the ground of consent given before the action is brought. They consider
this an arbitrary way to select a forum, apparently meaning that the selected forum
may have little relationship to the disputes which actually arise and may be an
inconvenient place to litigate. Id.
10 8 See Degnan & Barton, supra note 6, at 479. Compare St. Joseph & G.I. Ry.
v. Des Moines Union Ry., 180 Iowa 1292, 162 N.W. 812 (1917):
Ordinarily, if a third person, who is in fact liable over to the defendant as
claimed, neglects or ignores the notice given him, he does so at his peril, and
will be held to indemnify the defendant to the full extent of the judgment
rendered against the latter. This is not because such notice brings the person
notified within the jurisdiction of the court, or because the judgment entered
against the defendant is in any proper sense a judgment against him also,
but is rather because, having neglected his duty to protect the defendant
against loss on his account . . . he will be estopped . . . to deny that the
judgment against the latter is for the correct amount.
Id. at 1304, 162 N.W. at 816-17.
This suggests a slightly different argument: that the state has
indeed tried to eliminate the due process defense, but by agreement with
other states. It was stated above that a single state may not extend
its jurisdiction beyond due process limitations to the same extent that
the federal government can.0 9 However, this does not preclude the
possibility that two states could agree reciprocally to eliminate the right
of defendants to resist jurisdiction on due process grounds, in favor of
greater middleman protection. If such an agreement could be made
overtly, then, since it probably was the intention of the draftsmen of
the vouching provision to eliminate the due process defense, perhaps
this agreement ought to be implied in the UCC.
One objection to this argument is that a state ought not to be able
to eliminate the constitutional right of an individual. But this objec-
tion is not completely convincing, as the right of a defendant to resist
exercise of jurisdiction by another state is probably not solely a personal
right in the sense of the Bill of Rights, but is linked to the existence of
the federal system. A federal interpleader provision not subject to the
same due process limitations 11o is evidence thereof."' The right stems
at least in part from the need to restrict the exercise of a state's judicial
power to those individuals who knew or should have known that their
actions could conflict with the rights of citizens in foreign states. Thus,
there does not appear to be any reason why two states could not agree
that, at least between them, a manufacturer will be required to answer
for the damage his product causes when the possibility arises that a
retailer may be held solely responsible for the damage. This is cer-
tainly less offensive than one state alerting the residents of all other
states that they are potential defendants. Such an agreement would be
analogous to an agreement between states that an individual assume
responsibility for the support of a dependent, notwithstanding that the
claim of the dependent is brought in a jurisdiction which could not itself
exercise jurisdiction over him.-"
The answer to this argument must be the same as the answer to
the "implied in the contract" argument. It may indeed be possible for
109 Text accompanying notes 52-56 supra.
31028 U.S.C. § 2361 (1964) ; cf. 28 U.S.C. § 1335 (1964) ; FED. R. Civ. P. 4(f);
text accompanying note 51 supra.
211 The cases talk in terms of fairness to the defendant, which is indicative of a
personal right. No doubt there is a personal right not to have to answer to a petty
claim in a forum three thousand miles away. But this is not the kind of due process
limitation with which this Comment is concerned. The language of the cases also
suggests that the fairness is determined in part by the interest which the forum state
has in exercising jurisdiction. The state must show a greater interest in exercising
power over an individual than merely its desire to redress an injury to one of its
citizens. See quotations in text accompanying notes 19 & 27 supra.
112 See, e.g., Landes v. Landes, 1 N.Y.2d 358, 135 N.E2d 562, 153 N.Y.S.2d 14
(1956), in which a father was required by the Uniform Support of Dependents
Law, N.Y. Dom. REL. LAw § 37 (McKinney 1964), to provide support for his
dependent in California in spite of the inability of the California court to exercise its
jurisdiction over him. The statute accomplished this result by requiring the assistance
of the New York courts.
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two states to do this, but something more must be required of the states
than an implication from an obscure provision in the UCC. Although
the due process right may not be a strictly personal right, it does at
least contain the notion that the defendant is entitled to notice that his
conduct may invoke the exercise of power by another state.113 Legis-
latures that pass the UCC ought to give him that notice explicitly.
Another argument for denying application of due process pro-
tections to vouching contends that a vouched in person is not really
a party to the suit, but merely someone who had the opportunity to
assume the defense and is estopped by his failure to do so from denying
the validity of the findings." 4  This, too, is an evasive fiction. The
vouching provision authorizes the forum to bind a manufacturer whether
or not he is a named defendant, thereby compelling him to enter the
forum to protect those interests not shared with the named defendant,
the retailer. An estoppel theory assumes that the vouched in party had
the responsibility to defend in the first forum. The issue remains
whether that responsibility can be imposed by the vouching provision.
IV. CONCLUSION
The vouching provision as envisioned by the draftsmen of the
UCC was intended to avoid the application of due process standards
normally utilized to determine a state court's ability to bind a non-
resident to its holding. However, there is no good reason in either the
history or the inherent characteristics of vouching to permit avoidance
of these standards. The vouching provision is no more able to bind a
nonresident party than impleader or any similar joinder device.
Moreover, there is good reason to prefer the use of the federal im-
pleader provision (if diversity of citizenship and proper jurisdictional
amount are not in question) or a state impleader statute (if available)
in situations such as the consumer-retailer-manufacturer hypotheticals.
If the middleman can make use of impleader provisions, he can bind the
party to the judgment of the court and not just to factual determinations.
If the attempt to gain jurisdiction through impleader over the out of
state resident fails, UCC vouching, subject to the same jurisdictional
due process restraints, would also fail.
There are, however, some practical advantages that may save the
vouching provision from total ineffectiveness. A manufacturer, hoping
to avoid harmful publicity, may prefer vouching to impleader because
he can thereby avoid the trappings of defending as an official party. Fur-
thermore, he can avoid litigation of at least some issues, such as privity.
Finally, both the retailer and the manufacturer may prefer the vouching
provision to underplay the manufacturer's part in the litigation, lest the
113 See quotation at text accompanying note 19 supra.
314 See St. Joseph & G.I. Ry. v. Des Moines Union Ry., 180 Iowa 1292, 1304,
162 N.W. 812, 816-17 (1917) (quoted in note 108 supra).
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presence of a large, deep-pocketed company drive jury damage verdicts
unreasonably high.
Thus, the usefulness of UCC vouching is limited to those situations
where federal and state impleader provisions are unavailable, or to situ-
ations in which strategic advantage would be gained by the retailer or
manufacturer hiding behind the apron of vouching. These limitations
will disappoint the expectations of the draftsmen, but the Constitution
so demands.
Peter A. Gross
